source DEFENSE

Tag Managers Without Tears

Fast, Fearless Marketing Aligned with Security and Data Privacy

Introduction – Marketing Agility vs. Security Control

Modern tag management systems like Google Tag Manager (GTM), Tealium iQ, and Adobe Launch empower marketing teams to add analytics and advertising scripts to sites in minutes, without a developer. These systems function as client-side code deployment platforms, injecting third-party JavaScript across your pages. Each of these injected snippets, known as *tags*, can add new capabilities, from advertising pixels to personalization tools.

This agility is a double-edged sword: on one hand, marketing moves fast; on the other, security teams lose visibility and control over what code runs on sensitive pages (like checkout). The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 4.0.1 squarely addresses this tension. New requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 mandate rigorous management of payment-page scripts. Every script must be authorized, integrity-checked, inventoried, and monitored for changes.

The following sections outline how teams can maintain marketing agility while enforcing PCI-mandated security and compliance controls in a way that's fast, automatic, and audit-ready. Even if your organization isn't mandated by PCI DSS, there are other forms of compliance and data privacy protection that require a similar understanding of, and solution to this problem.

Tag Managers: Convenience & Risk in the Browser

What Tag Managers Do

In the past, adding marketing or analytics scripts meant editing site code for each new vendor. Tag managers revolutionized this by letting you include one container snippet which then dynamically loads all other tags configured via a web interface. This drastically simplifies deployment.

For example, instead of hardcoding 5 different `<script src="...">` tags for analytics, personalization, ads, etc., you include a single `<script src="gtm.js?id=GTM-XYZ">` and manage the rest through the tag manager UI. Non-developers can add or update tags on the fly, keeping marketing campaigns nimble.

The Unseen Danger

By design, tag managers execute whatever JavaScript is added to them, including third-party code, directly in the end-user's browser. In effect, your production website gets a secondary software supply chain that bypasses traditional code review.

Every tag or custom HTML added via the tag manager is new code running on your site – code that can read forms, modify the page, or send data offsite. This generates an attack surface for cyber criminals, and a data leakage problem that jeopardizes overall data privacy.

Google Tag Manager (GTM) in particular is extremely popular (over 94% market share as of 2023) due to its ease of use and cost (free), but it's also very open-ended. Teams often leverage GTM's flexibility to insert arbitrary custom scripts for tracking and A/B tests, and attackers have learned to abuse this openness. Tealium and Adobe's tag managers, by contrast, cater to enterprises with more built-in governance (hundreds of pre-built integrations to minimize custom code, role-based access controls, and audit logs).

These differences mean that misconfiguration or misuse of a tag manager can directly translate to security vulnerabilities. Google Tag Manager's open nature allows anyone with access to inject custom JavaScript. If an attacker gains admin access or compromises a tag, they can run malicious code on your site. As we'll see, this scenario isn't hypothetical, it's happening regularly in the wild.

Contrasting Website Code Deployment Workflows



PCI DSS 4.0.1: What Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 Demand

PCI DSS requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 were introduced in version 4.0.1 to tackle the growing threat of client-side attacks on e-Commerce websites. They are no longer “best practices”, **they have been mandatory for any in-scope environment since March 2025.**

Requirement 6.4.3 - Script Control

In plain language, 6.4.3 requires you to establish control over every script that can run on a payment page. That means you should have:

- An up-to-date inventory of all scripts
- Documented business justification for each
- A method to ensure each script is authorized and unaltered (integrity-verified)

The intent is to prevent unauthorized or unknown scripts (including those added via tag managers) from ever executing during the payment process.

Requirement 11.6.1 - Change Detection

Meanwhile, 11.6.1 focuses on the detection side: you must:

- Monitor for unauthorized changes to the payment page content or scripts
- Alert on any tampering
- Scan at least once every seven days or as defined by your risk analysis

This implies using change-detection tools that can notice if a script file or critical page element is modified unexpectedly, with checks at least weekly (or in real-time) to promptly catch web skimming injections.

Important Note: These requirements explicitly extend to **third-party scripts** loaded in the consumer’s browser. Whether a script comes from your own domain or a marketing tech vendor, if it runs on the checkout page, it falls under 6.4.3’s authorization/integrity rules. Tag managers don’t get a free pass. Code they inject must be inventoried and controlled like any other.

In summary, PCI 6.4.3/11.6.1 force organizations to treat client-side scripts with the same scrutiny as server-side code, requiring **tight control, continuous monitoring, and auditability.**

The E-Skimming Threat: How Tag Managers Get Exploited

It's not hard to see why the PCI Council put these controls in place. Over the past few years, Magecart and similar eSkimming groups have repeatedly found pathways through unchecked third-party code. Attackers exploit the trust and access that tag manager scripts have.

In 2021 researchers documented over 300 ecommerce sites infected via **trojanized Google Tag Manager containers**, where attackers either embedded malicious skimming code inside the GTM container itself or had the container load it from an external server.

In these cases, the GTM container effectively became a vehicle to distribute malware, capitalizing on the ability to place JavaScript within the GTM container and using Google's own infrastructure to appear benign.

Tens of thousands of stolen credit card records were traced to campaigns like these. Smaller online merchants are often the targets, since they may lack the security monitoring of larger enterprises.

> **Google Tag Manager was the dominant intrusion path:** GTM showed up in over one-third of documented attacks, and attackers used chain attacks, direct container injection, and coordinated domain migration to maintain access.
> - *2025 eSkimming Threat Landscape Report*

Attacker tactics are evolving

Apart from simply injecting rogue scripts, attackers use techniques like modular multi-stage payloads and heavy obfuscation to avoid detection. **Source Defense's groundbreaking 2025 eSkimming Threat Report** study showed a campaign where multiple GTM containers worked in tandem; one container served as a loader that in turn loaded additional GTMs responsible for executing the attack code. Another trick is hiding malicious code in unexpected places like CSS files or image files.

In one observed case, the eSkimmer code was embedded inside a fake CSS file (under a GTM's instruction), then extracted and executed via JavaScript, all to sneak past Content Security Policy (CSP) rules and scanners. Attackers also often trigger their eSkimmer only on actual payment pages or at specific events (like form submit) to remain invisible until the critical moment.

Two main forms of client-side attack have emerged; eSkimming and Formjacking (fake forms).

eSkimming

This is where a malicious script quietly **listens to keystrokes or form fields** on the real checkout page and exfiltrates data in the background.

This is often done by injecting code that hooks into input events (for instance, capturing credit card number as you type). Because it piggybacks on legitimate pages and network calls, it's very hard for users (or sometimes the site owner) to notice anything is amiss.

Formjacking

This is where the attacker **inserts a fake payment form or overlay** that mimics the real checkout. When the customer enters their card info, it goes straight to the attacker. Frequently the user will be shown an error ("Payment failed, please re-enter details") after the first attempt, which then passes them to the real form - by then the theft has occurred.

These fake forms can be virtually pixel-perfect. Attackers can leverage tag managers or other third-party access to present a completely authentic-looking experience while harvesting data under the hood.

The consequences of these exploits are severe: stolen card data leads to fraud losses and brand damage, and affected companies may face hefty fines or breach notification costs. It also directly impacts PCI compliance standing.

A breach is strong evidence of non-compliance. All of this underscores why **uncontrolled tag manager scripts** pose a serious eSkimming and PCI DSS compliance risk and why new controls are in place to rein them in.

Why CSP and SRI Alone Aren't Enough

A common first thought for addressing third-party script risk is to use Content Security Policy (CSP) allowlists and Subresource Integrity (SRI) hashes. In fact, the current guidance in PCI DSS 4.0.1 mentions these as possible controls.

CSP allows you to define which domains are allowed to serve scripts to your pages, and SRI ensures a script file hasn't been altered by verifying its cryptographic hash.

However, these tools become difficult to manage in environments that rely on tag managers. Every time a new tag is added, often by a marketing team operating independently, CSP rules would need to be updated to avoid breaking functionality.

This forces security and marketing into a constant back-and-forth, undermining the agility tag managers are designed to provide. As a result, CSP and SRI have significant limitations in the context of modern dynamic websites and eSkimming/Magecart-style threats.

Limitations of CSP

Content Security Policy is essentially a whitelist of script origins. For example, you might allow https://www.googletagmanager.com and your own domain, and block everything else. That helps prevent a rogue script from an arbitrary new domain.

However, CSP does not inspect the behavior of allowed scripts. If an attacker finds a way to inject malicious code from an allowed domain (say, by compromising a script on a trusted CDN or using a service like GTM which is on your allowlist), CSP won't stop it.

Unfortunately, many real incidents have done exactly that. Attackers intentionally host malware on or through trusted sources to bypass CSP. A report noted "many notorious web skimming attacks exploited the CSP-approved status of trusted servers to inject malicious code."

Another issue is maintenance and granularity. CSP rules can get complex; you might inadvertently break functionality if you're too strict (blocking a needed third-party), so teams often end up allowing broad domains (*.cloudfront.net for example) which lowers effectiveness.

And CSP doesn't cover everything. If an allowed script itself dynamically loads another script or opens a WebSocket, CSP might not catch that (depending on directives).

Limitations of SRI

Subresource Integrity ensures that the script file fetched by the browser hasn't been altered, by verifying its cryptographic hash. The challenge with SRI is that it only works when the script content is static and predictable, every time a script is updated, even slightly, the hash in your HTML must be manually updated to match.

On modern websites that rely on tag managers, where marketing teams regularly add or modify scripts without involving developers, this becomes unmanageable.

If the hash isn't updated in time, the browser will block the script, potentially breaking site functionality. That puts security and marketing into a constant loop of coordination, undermining the flexibility tag managers are meant to provide.

Even beyond maintenance challenges, SRI has functional blind spots. It only verifies that a script matches an expected file. It can't detect if the file itself is malicious, just that it hasn't changed.

And it doesn't protect against behavior that occurs at runtime, such as scripts loading additional code, opening WebSockets, or exfiltrating data from the page.

In the dynamic, fast-moving world of tag managers and third-party integrations, it's not a realistic or effective defense.

No Behavior Control or Tamper Detection

Perhaps the biggest gap relative to PCI 4.0.1's goals is that neither CSP nor SRI provides **active monitoring or runtime protection**.

CSP doesn't tell you if an allowed script suddenly starts stealing data, and SRI by itself doesn't alert you that someone tried to inject new code (it would silently block it if the hash fails, but you might not even know).

They also **don't produce the compliance** evidence you need such as an inventory of scripts with business justification, or a log that a script was changed and an alert was generated.

Requirement 11.6.1 expects that you detect and respond to unauthorized changes, which implies a monitoring/logging capability that CSP/SRI alone don't offer.

As the PCI Council's guidance suggests, these controls can help reduce risk but **additional measures or tools are needed to fully satisfy 6.4.3 and 11.6.1.**

They address the *"where scripts come from"* and *"has the file changed"* questions, but not *"what is the script doing"* or *"did my page get tampered with this week."* For that, we turn to more dynamic solutions.

	CSP	SRI	Behavioral Protection *(Source Defense)
Monitors Script Behavior	✗	✗	✓
Prevents Trusted-Site eSkimming	✗	✗	✓
Supports Dynamic Marketing	Maintenance Loop	Maintenance Loop	✓
Automated PCI Compliance & Evidence	No	No	✓

**Meets PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1*

Compliance Gaps and Audit Challenges with Tag Managers

Before we dive into solutions, it's worth examining how tag managers (and third-party scripts in general) have posed challenges in PCI compliance audits. Under older PCI versions, many organizations had a false sense of security.

They might have had strong server-side controls and assumed front-end scripts were "just marketing" and not in scope. PCI DSS 4.0.1 has shattered that illusion, and auditors (QSAs) are now honing in on client-side script governance.

Where gaps commonly occur

An audit may ask, "Show me your inventory of all scripts running on the payment page, and evidence that each is approved and has integrity controls." Without preparation, the typical response used to be blank stares or scrambling through GTM accounts.

Many companies simply did not have a process to inventory scripts on an ongoing basis. Marketing tags could be added at any time, including external pixels or scripts that themselves load other scripts (so-called fourth-party scripts).

It's easy to lose track - in fact, an analysis conducted by Verizon Business and Source Defense for 2024 Payment Security Report of over 7,000 large merchant sites found **129,000+ distinct external scripts,** with **40% of them present on payment pages**, and even some tags calling additional unseen scripts from yet more domains.

Without tooling, keeping an up-to-date list of these and ensuring each one is "authorized and necessary" is a monumental task. This has led to compliance gaps where organizations thought they were compliant but were not in practice.

According to Verizon's 2024 Payment Security Report, only **43% of organizations maintain full PCI compliance year-round** (many fall out of compliance between audits). One reason for that lapse is the difficulty of sustaining controls like script reviews continuously.

Manual review is impractical

Consider a marketing team using GTM who adds or updates tags frequently. A security or compliance team would need to manually review those changes, verify the script sources, maybe hash the files for integrity, and log a justification for each.

Not only is this time-consuming, it's prone to human error. We've heard from companies that attempted quarterly script reviews with spreadsheets, only to find by the time they finished one round, new tags had been added.

This manual approach often fails to catch something like a rogue script added briefly and removed, or a tag that injects a surprise fourth-party call. It also tends to create friction internally ("Security is slowing down our tag deployments!") which can lead to workarounds and further non-compliance.

All of these issues demonstrate why an **automated, continuous solution** is needed for script management in PCI 4.0.



Audit failure scenarios

If a QSA finds unapproved scripts on a payment page or discovers the organization can't demonstrate integrity monitoring, that's a likely **non-compliance finding**. In the worst case, a breach will make it blatantly clear. The PCI Council has even issued bulletins about Magecart, essentially warning that without proper script management, you're not compliant.

Some early adopters of PCI 4.0.1 controls have shared their experiences. Hollywood Bowl (a UK entertainment venue) noted that using an automated client-side security solution gave their assessors confidence.

Instead of tedious manual tag reviews, the tool provided script inventories and tamper alerts that "satisfy 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 automatically." This not only helps pass the audit but speeds it up.

Conversely, without such measures, organizations have faced extended audits and remediation periods as they rush to implement stopgap measures (like slapping CSP headers on at the last minute or desperately trying to document each tag's purpose).

It's also worth mentioning legal and reputational fallout. Compliance gaps can lead to breaches, which lead to fines and lawsuits. Under GDPR, British Airways and Ticketmaster were fined for their Magecart breaches, and PCI non-compliance can result in penalties from card networks.

But even aside from fines, losing customer trust due to a payment breach is costly. All this reinforces that the **old approach of "ignore the tag manager, focus on the server" is no longer tenable.** Auditors will specifically check for client-side controls now, and organizations should be prepared to demonstrate how they authorize scripts and monitor changes.

In short, tag managers must be treated with the same rigor as any code deployment system touching cardholder data. The good news is that behavioral based solutions and best practices exist to fill these gaps which allow you to keep marketing happy while proactively satisfying auditors and security requirements.

Keeping Marketing Fast and Secure: Best Practices and Solutions

Achieving both agility and security is possible with the right strategy. It boils down to layered controls and smart use of technology to automate what would otherwise bog down your teams. Let's break down a comprehensive approach:

Establish Governance for Tag Deployments

You don't want to remove the tag manager (and neither does marketing), so put guardrails around it. This means instituting a **script approval workflow**. Every script that is destined for the payment page, whether added via tag manager or directly, should go through a basic vetting: *Who is the owner? What is its purpose? Does it need to access payment data?*

Maintain a simple record of this information. PCI 6.4.3 effectively requires that you have a "written justification" for each payment-page script, so doing this not only improves security understanding but also creates documentation for compliance.

Also leverage role-based access features of your Tag Management System (TMS). Ensure that only authorized team members (who understand the implications) can publish to the production container. Remove or limit "everyone can add tags" if that's currently the case. While this might introduce a slight delay for certain changes, it's far better than a free-for-all.

Importantly, educate the marketing and analytics teams about the risks. Often, they simply aren't aware that adding a new "chat widget" or A/B test to a checkout page could introduce a security hole.

Once they understand that their tools can be targeted by attackers, they're more likely to follow the process. The goal is a collaborative approach: marketing still moves fast, but with transparency and input from security.

In practice, once a library of approved tags is built, most new additions will be variations of known ones, making approvals quicker.

A behavioral based tool like Source Defense can automate this governance model without adding friction. It enforces a script approval workflow by identifying every script loaded on payment pages, capturing who deployed it, what its intended purpose is, and whether it interacts with sensitive fields like payment data.

It also helps restrict who can deploy new tags by aligning with role-based access controls, ensuring only authorized users can introduce changes to production environments.

This allows marketing to move quickly within a defined security perimeter, enabling them to add tags safely, without bypassing oversight or introducing unnecessary risk.

Deploy Source Defense's Behavioral Based Solution

Source Defense automatically enforces PCI compliance and script security from the moment a tag is added, without slowing down marketing teams or requiring ongoing intervention from security or GRC.

It overlays directly onto your existing tag manager setup, hardening the client side without forcing changes to workflow, pace, or priorities. Marketing moves at full speed; Source Defense handles the risk.

At the core of Source Defense's approach is behavior-based sandboxing that intercepts potentially dangerous actions by any script. It can enforce policies like "this analytics script is allowed to read and send aggregate data, but not allowed to touch credit card fields or make rogue network requests."

If a script violates policy, the platform can block that action on the fly. This means even if an eSkimming code snippet gets onto your page, when it tries to exfiltrate data or alter the DOM, it can be stopped in real-time.

Source Defense comes with out-of-the-box policies and machine learning to distinguish normal vs. suspicious behavior, and it is updated continuously as new threats emerge. It operates in real time in the browser, which is critical for stopping fast attacks - no need to wait for an alert and human intervention; the attack is prevented.

Notably, a behavior-based solution like Source Defense can address scenarios CSP can't. If an allowed script from Google Analytics suddenly tries to scrape card data, CSP would allow it (since it's from a trusted domain), but Source Defense's behavior-based policy will detect and block that anomalous behavior.

From a PCI perspective, Source Defense directly meets 6.4.3's requirements by enforcing that only authorized script behavior occurs and providing an inventory of all scripts and what they're doing.

And it covers 11.6.1 by monitoring and preventing unauthorized modifications in real time, with detailed logs. In fact, independent assessors (QSAs) like **Coalfire** and **VikingCloud** have evaluated Source Defense and confirmed it can satisfy the PCI criteria when configured properly.

Performance and Business Considerations

One of the themes here is keeping marketing fast. Any solution that requires weeks of testing or that breaks site functionality will face resistance. Therefore, **prioritize solutions that are lightweight and compatible** - like Source Defense.

When deploying a security script via a tag manager, ensure it's set to load asynchronously and not impact page load times. Monitor your Core Web Vitals to ensure adding security code hasn't slowed the site. In many cases, the impact is so minimal that marketing won't notice, but it's worth validating.

Another key is operational effort. If a tool floods your team with alerts for every minor script change, it can create alert fatigue and actually slow down your response to real issues. Look for solutions like **Source Defense** which incorporates intelligence like risk scoring so you only get **high-fidelity** alerts.

From a compliance reporting standpoint, lean on your tools to generate the **evidence**. Look for a tool that has a **"**PCI dashboard" or export function that compiles the necessary reports for assessors such as an exportable script inventory with all the fields needed (name, source, last update, approval status), and tamper detection logs with timestamps and notes. Using these not only saves time during assessment, it impresses auditors because it's clear and systematic.

As a case in point, Nextiva (a cloud communications company) has stated that with Source Defense's solution, compliance with 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 became "completely automated," and they had a PCI dashboard that basically showed real-time compliance status.

That's the ideal scenario, **where your security tool is doing the heavy lifting to prove compliance,** and your team just oversees it rather than manually compiling evidence.

Finally, consider vendor support and expertise. This is a new area for many security teams; Source Defense is the pioneer in client-side protection, it is trusted by the world's leading brands, by card brands like Mastercard, by Merchant acquirers, QSAs, et al. It has unparalleled expertise in the space.

- **Deployed as two lines of code -** no heavy agent or complex setup
- **Lightweight client-side protection -** < 2 hours of monthly management
- **Engineered for performance -** protects without impacting Core Web Vitals

Conclusion – Fast, Fearless Marketing Through Security

Tag managers can be but don't have to be a nightmare for security teams. With the right approach, you can let marketing move at the speed of business while eliminating the blind spots and risks that unmanaged third-party scripts introduce. PCI DSS 4.0.1's new requirements have raised the bar, but they ultimately benefit organizations by forcing us to address a real threat that was too long ignored. By implementing governance processes, continuous monitoring, and real-time protection, you create an environment where marketing and security objectives align: both want a smoothly running site that customers trust.

In practice, organizations that have embraced these practices find that after an initial adjustment period, they actually accelerate in productivity - security spends less time firefighting or doing tedious reviews (the system handles it), and marketing gains confidence that they can try new tags or tools safely under the guardrail of security controls. It truly becomes "tag management without tears," because the conflicts and last-minute emergencies subside.

For CISOs & AppSec Leaders

Your goal should be to operationalize PCI 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 such that it's continuously met in the background of your business. The technology and solutions now exist to do that. Whether it's through a behavior-based sandbox, an intelligent monitoring service, or a combination, you can achieve full visibility and control over what's executing in your users' browsers.

For Marketing Teams

Marketing teams keep their agility. By treating tag manager deployments with the same care as code deployments, and layering in modern client-side defenses, you turn a security liability into a strength. eSkimmers will keep evolving, but you will have the tools to catch them. Customers can complete transactions knowing their data is safe, and marketing can roll out innovations.

The Bottom Line

Your organization stays out of the breach headlines. That's a win-win-win that proves compliance and agility are not mutually exclusive. By following the strategies outlined and leveraging the right solutions, you can keep marketing fast and fearless, while staying fully compliant with PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1.
No tears necessary.